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Abstract
We show the existence of involuntary unemployment based on consumers’ utility
maximization and firms’ profit maximization behavior under monopolistic compe-
tition with increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a
three-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model with a childhood period as well
as younger and older periods. We also analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed
by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage) to achieve full-employment under a situa-
tion with involuntary unemployment. We show the following results. 1) If the real-
ization of full employment will increase consumers’ disposable income, in order to
achieve full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment, we need a
budget deficit (Proposition 1). 2) If the full-employment state has been achieved, we
do not need budget deficit to maintain full-employment (Proposition 2). Addition-
ally we present a game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary unemployment and
full-employment.
Keywords: Involuntary unemployment, Three-periods overlapping generations model,
Monopolistic competition.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effects of fiscal policy to achieve full-employment under
a situation with involuntary unemployment. Involuntary unemployment in this paper
is a situation where workers are willing to work at the market wage or just below but
are prevented by factors beyond their control, mainly, deficiency of aggregate demand.
Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping labor demand curve from the mark-up princi-
ple for firms, and argued that such an upward-sloping labor demand curve leads to the
existence of involuntary unemployment without wage rigidity1. But his model of firm
behavior is ad-hoc. Otaki (2009) says that there exists involuntary unemployment for two
reasons: (i) the nominal wage rate is set above the reservation nominal wage rate; and
(ii) the employment level and economic welfare never improve by lowering the nomi-
nal wage rate. He assume indivisibility (or inelasticity) of individual labor supply, and
has shown the existence of involuntary unemployment using efficient wage bargaining
according to McDonald and Solow (1981). The arguments of this paper, however, do not
depend on bargaining. If labor supply is indivisible, itmay be 1 or 0. On the other hand, if
it is divisible, it takes a real value between 0 and 1. As discussed by Otaki (2015) (Theorem
2.3) and Otaki (2012), if the labor supply is divisible and very small, no unemployment
exists2. However, we show that even if labor supply is divisible, unless it is so small,
there may exit involuntary unemployment. We consider consumers’ utility maximiza-
tion and firms’ profit maximization in an overlapping generations (OLG) model under
monopolistic competition according to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015), and demonstrate
the existence of involuntary unemployment without the assumption of wage rigidity.
Alsoweanalyze the effects of fiscal policyfinancedby tax andbudget deficit (or seignior-
age). We show the following results.
1. If the realization of full employment will increase consumers’ disposable income,
in order to achieve full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment,
we need a budget deficit. (Proposition 1)
2. If the full-employment state has been achieved, we do not need budget deficit to
maintain full-employment. (Proposition 2)
From these results we can say that in order to achieve full-employment from a state with
involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the government. However, when
full-employment is achieved, in order to maintain full-employment we need balanced
budget. Therefore, additional government expenditure to achieve full-employment should
be financed by seigniorage not public debt.
In the next section we analyze and show the existence of involuntary unemployment
under monopolistic competition with increasing or decreasing or constant returns to
scale technology using a three-periods OLG model with a childhood period as well as
younger (working) and older (retired) periods. Also we consider pay-as-you go pension
1Lavoie (2001) presented a similar analysis.
2About the indivisible labor supply also please see Hansen (1985).
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system for the older generation. In a simple two-periods OLG model falls in the nomi-
nal wage rate and prices of goods may increase consumption and employment by the
so-called real balance effect. In such a model consumers have savings for future con-
sumption, but no debt. In a three-periods model with childhood period they consume
goods in their childhood period by borrowingmoney from (employed) consumers of the
previous generation and/or scholarships, and must repay their debts in the next period.
Real value of the debt is increased by falls in the nominal wage rate and prices, and con-
sumptions and employment may decrease. In addition to this configuration we consider
a pay-as-you go pension system for the older generationwhichmay reduce the savings of
consumers. We think our model is more general and realistic than a simple two-periods
OLG model. In Section 3 we examine the effects of a fall in the nominal wage rate. In
our three-periods OLGmodel with pay-as-you-go pension increases in consumption and
employment due to falls in the nominal wage rate and prices of goods might be small or
even negative. In Section 4 we study the fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit
(or seigniorage) to achieve full-employment at a state with involuntary unemployment.
Additionally we present a game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary unemployment
and full-employment in Section 5.
As wewill state in the concluding remarks, themain limitation of this paper is that the
goods are produced by only labor and there exists no capital and investment of firms. A
study of the problem of involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in such a situation
is the theme of future research.
This paper is an extension and generalization of some recent our papers, Tanaka (2020b)
andTanaka (2020a) inwhichweanalyze the existence of involuntaryunemployment and
fiscal policy under perfect competition with indivisible labor supply.
Schultz (1992) showed that there does not exist involuntary unemployment in an over-
lapping generations model. His arguments depends on the real balance effect on con-
sumption of the older generations consumers. Even with involuntary unemployment,
the nominal wage rate does not necessarily fall. In this paper, however, we consider a
three generations overlapping generations model with pay-as-you go pension to explore
the possibility of avoiding the real balance effect. See Section 3.
2 Existence of involuntary unemployment
2.1 Consumers
Weconsider a three-periods (0: childhood, 1: younger orworking, and 2: older or retired)
OLG model under monopolistic competition. It is a re-arrangement and an extension of
the model put forth by Otaki (2007), Otaki (2009), and Otaki (2015). The structure of our
model is as follows.
1. There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of perishable
goods indexed by 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1]. Good 𝑧 is monopolistically produced by firm 𝑧 with
increasing or decreasing or constant returns to scale technology.
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2. Consumers consume the goods during the childhood period (Period 0). This con-
sumption is coveredbyborrowingmoney from (employed) consumers of the younger
generation and/or scholarships. They must repay these debts in their Period 1.
However, unemployed consumers cannot repay their own debts. Therefore, we
assume that unemployed consumers receive unemployment benefits from the gov-
ernment, which are covered by taxes on employed consumers of the younger gen-
eration.
3. During Period 1, consumers supply 𝑙 units of labor, repay the debts and savemoney
for their consumption in Period 2. They also pay taxes for the pay-as-you gopension
system for the older generation.
4. During Period 2, consumers consume the goods using their savings carried over
from their Period 1 earnings, and receive the pay-as-you go pension, which is a
lump-sum payment. It is covered by taxes on employed consumers of the younger
generation.
5. Consumers determine their consumptions in Periods 1 and 2 and the labor supply
at the beginning of Period 1. We assume that their consumption during the child-
hood period is constant.
We use the following notation.
𝐶𝑒
𝑖
: consumption basket of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝐶𝑢
𝑖
: consumption basket of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑐𝑒
𝑖
(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑐𝑢
𝑖
(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝐷: consumption basket of an individual in the childhood period, which is constant.
𝑃𝑖 : the price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑝𝑖 (𝑧): the price of good 𝑧 in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜌 = 𝑃2
𝑃1
: (expected) inflation rate (plus one).
𝑊 : nominal wage rate.
𝑅: unemployment benefit for an unemployed individual. 𝑅 = 𝐷.
?ˆ?: consumption basket in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄: pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the older generation.
Θ: tax payment by an employed individual for the unemployment benefit.
?ˆ?: pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the younger generation when he retires.
Ψ: tax payment by an employed individual for the pay-as-you-go pension.
Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer.
𝑙: labor supply of an individual.
Γ(𝑙): disutility function of labor, which is increasing and convex.
𝐿: total employment.
𝐿 𝑓 : population of labor or employment in the full-employment state.
𝑦(𝐿𝑙): labor productivity, which is increasing or decreasing or constant
with respect to “employment × labor supply” (𝐿𝑙).
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We assume that the population 𝐿 𝑓 is constant.
We consider a two-step method to solve utility maximization of consumers such that:
1. Employed and unemployed consumers maximize their utility by determining con-
sumption baskets in Periods 1 and 2 given their income over two periods:
2. Then, they maximize their consumption baskets given the expenditure in each pe-
riod.
We define the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to “employment × labor
supply” as follows,
𝜁 =
𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝐿𝑙
.
We assume that −1 < 𝜁 < 1, and 𝜁 is constant. Increasing (decreasing or constant)
returns to scale means 𝜁 > 0 (𝜁 < 0 or 𝜁 = 0).
Since the taxes for unemployed consumers’ debts are paid by employed consumers of
the same generation, 𝐷 and Θ satisfy the following relationship.
𝐷(𝐿 𝑓 − 𝐿) = 𝐿Θ.
This means
𝐿(𝐷 + Θ) = 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷.
The price of the consumption basket in Period 0 is assumed to be 1. Thus, 𝐷 is the real
value of the consumption in the childhood period of consumers.
Also, since the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system are paid by employed con-
sumers of younger generation, 𝑄 and Ψ satisfy the following relationship:
𝐿Ψ = 𝐿 𝑓𝑄.
The utility function of employed consumers of one generation over three periods is
written as
𝑢(𝐶𝑒
1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
, 𝐷) − Γ(𝑙).
We assume that 𝑢(·) is a homothetic utility function. The utility function of unemployed
consumers is
𝑢(𝐶𝑢
1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
, 𝐷).
The consumption baskets of employed and unemployed consumers in Period 𝑖 are
𝐶𝑒𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒𝑖 (𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2,
and
𝐶𝑢𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢𝑖 (𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and 𝜎 > 1.
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The price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖 is
𝑃𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑝𝑖 (𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜎
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
The budget constraint for en employed consumer is3
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ.
The budget constraint for en unemployed consumer is
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
= Π − 𝐷 + 𝑅 + ?ˆ?
Since 𝑅 = 𝐷,
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
= Π + ?ˆ?.
Let
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
, 1 − 𝛼 =
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
. (1) al1
Since the utility functions 𝑢(𝐶𝑒
1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
, 𝐷) and 𝑢(𝐶𝑢
1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
, 𝐷) are homothetic, 𝛼 is determined
by the relative price 𝑃2
𝑃1
, and do not depend on the income of the consumers. Therefore,
we have
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
1 − 𝛼 =
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
From the first order conditions and the budget constraints for employed and unem-
ployed consumers we obtain the following demand functions for consumption baskets.
𝐶𝑒
1
= 𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃2
,
and
𝐶𝑢
1
= 𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
= (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
.
Lagrange functions in the second step for employed and unemployed consumers are
ℒ
𝑒
1
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
(2) cal1
− 𝜆𝑒
1
[∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ)
]
,
3Employed consumers of the younger generation lend money to consumers in the childhood period of
the next generation. It is repaid in the next period.
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ℒ
𝑒
2
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑒
2
[∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − (1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ)
]
,
ℒ
𝑢
1
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢
1
[∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑢
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
,
and
ℒ
𝑢
2
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢
2
[∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑢
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
.
𝜆𝑒
1
, 𝜆𝑒
2
, 𝜆𝑢
1
and 𝜆𝑢
2
are Lagrange multipliers. Solving these maximization problems, the
following demand functions of employed and unemployed consumers are derived4.
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ)
𝑃1
,
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ)
𝑃2
,
𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃1
,
and
𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼)(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃2
.
From these analyses we obtain the indirect utility functions of employed and unem-
ployed consumers as follows:
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
− Γ(𝑙),
and
𝑉𝑢 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
.
Let
𝜔 =
𝑊
𝑃1
, 𝜌 =
𝑃2
𝑃1
.
Then, since the real value of 𝐷 in the childhood period is constant, we can write
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝜑
(
𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
− Γ(𝑙),
4About some calculations of these maximization problems please see Appendix
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𝑉𝑢 = 𝜑
(
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
,
𝜔 is the real wage rate. Denote
𝐼 = 𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
. (3) i
The condition for maximization of 𝑉 𝑒 with respect to 𝑙 given 𝜌 is
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
𝜔 − Γ′(𝑙) = 0, (4) ve
where
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
= 𝛼
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒
1
+ (1 − 𝛼)
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒
2
.
Given 𝑃1 and 𝜌 the labor supply is a function of 𝜔. From (4) we get
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
=
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔𝑙
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔2
. (5) ve2
If 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, the labor supply is increasing with respect to the real wage rate 𝜔.
2.2 Firms
Let 𝑑1(𝑧) be the total demand for good 𝑧 by younger generation consumers in Period 1.
Then,
𝑑1(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿Θ + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿Ψ)
𝑃1
=
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼 (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄)
𝑃1
.
This is the sum of the demand of employed and unemployed consumers. Note that ?ˆ? is
the pay-as-you-go pension for younger generation consumers in their Period 2. Similarly,
their total demand for good 𝑧 in Period 2 is written as
𝑑2(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎 (1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄)
𝑃2
.
Let 𝑑2(𝑧) be the demand for good 𝑧 by the older generation. Then,
𝑑2(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 (1 − ?¯?) (?¯?𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯? + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯?)
𝑃1
,
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where?¯? , Π¯, 𝐿, 𝑙, ?¯? and ?¯? are the nominalwage rate, the profits of firms, the employment,
the individual labor supply, the debt of an individual, and the pay-as-you-go pension,
respectively, during the previous period. ?¯? is the value of 𝛼 for the older generation. 𝑄
is the pay-as-you-go pension for consumers of the older generation themselves. Let
𝑀 = (1 − ?¯?)
(
?¯?𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯?
)
.
This is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation consumers in-
cluding the pay-as-you-go pensions they receive in their Period 2. It is the planned con-
sumption that is determined in Period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net savings
is the difference between𝑀 and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their Period 2, as follows:
𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄.
Their demand for good 𝑧 is written as
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑀
𝑃1
. Government expenditure constitutes
the national income as well as the consumptions of the younger and older generations.
Then, the total demand for good 𝑧 is written as
𝑑 (𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑌
𝑃1
, (6) dz
where 𝑌 is the effective demand defined by
𝑌 = 𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Note that ?ˆ? is consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. 𝐺
is the government expenditure, except for the pay-as-you-go pensions, scholarships and
unemployment benefits (seeOtaki (2007), Otaki (2015) about this demand function). Now,
we assume that 𝐺 is financed by seigniorage similarly to Otaki (2007) and Otaki (2009).
In a later section, we will consider the government’s budget constraint with respect to
taxes.
Let 𝐿 and 𝐿𝑙 be employment and the “employment × labor supply” of firm 𝑧. The total
employment and the total “employment × labor supply” are also∫
1
0
𝐿𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿,
∫
1
0
𝐿𝑙𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿𝑙.
The output of firm 𝑧 is 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙). At the equilibrium 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑑 (𝑧). Then, we have
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
= ( 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′)
𝜕(𝐿𝑙)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
.
From (6)
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
= −𝜎
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑝1(𝑧)
.
9
The profit of firm 𝑧 is
𝜋(𝑧) = 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑑 (𝑧) −
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
The condition for profit maximization is
𝜕𝜋(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) +
©­«𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝑦′𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)2
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) +
©­«𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) − 𝜎
(
𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
)
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑝1(𝑧)
= 0
Therefore, we obtain
𝑝1(𝑧) = −
𝜎
(1 − 𝜎) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
Let 𝜇 = 1
𝜎
. Then,
𝑝1(𝑧) =
1
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
This means that the real wage rate is
𝜔 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙). (7) real
With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale, 𝜔 is increasing (decreasing or
constant) with respect to “employment × labor supply” 𝐿𝑙.
From (3), (4) and (7), we have
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − Γ′(𝑙) = 0,
with
𝐼 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
.
Then, from (5)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝜔
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
=
[
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙
]
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦′
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
[(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦′]2
.
Assuming 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 𝑦′ > 0 (𝑦 < 0), this is
positive (negative). Since
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
, (8) ll1
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
=
(
𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
.
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Thus,
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑙
1 − 𝐿 𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
.
Usually 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
and 𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
have the same sign, and we assume
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
> 0 in (8). Also, since
−1 < 𝜁 < 1, we have
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙))
𝐿𝑙
= 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′ = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) (1 + 𝜁 ) > 0. (9) out1
Then, the output 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increases by an increase in 𝐿.
Since all firms are symmetric,
𝑃1 = 𝑝1(𝑧) =
1
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊. (10) price
2.3 Involuntary unemployment
Aggregate supply of the goods is equal to
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙).
Aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Since they are equal,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀,
or
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
1 − 𝛼
.
In real terms5
𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
, (11) e3
or
𝐿𝑙 =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
From (4) and (5) the individual labor supply 𝑙 is a (usually increasing) function of 𝜔.
From (7) 𝜔 is a function of 𝐿𝑙. With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale
technology it is increasing (decreasing or constant) with respect to 𝐿𝑙 or with respect
5 1
1−𝛼
is a multiplier.
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to 𝐿 given 𝑙. The individual labor supply 𝑙 may be increasing or decreasing in 𝐿 or 𝐿𝑙.
However, we assume that 𝐿𝑙 is increasing in 𝐿. This requires
𝑑𝐿𝑙
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 +
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
> 0.
It means 𝐿𝑙 < 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 for 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 . The equilibrium value of 𝐿𝑙 cannot be larger than 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙.
However, it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙. Then, we have 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 and involuntary
umemployment exists.
If the government collects a lump-sum tax 𝑇 from the younger generation consumers,
the aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
2.4 Discussion summary
The real wage rate depends on the employment elasticity of the labor productivity and
the employment level. But the employment level does not depend on the real wage rate.
The real aggregate demand and the employment level are determined by the value of
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
𝑃1
. (12) ll
If the employment is smaller than the labor population, then involuntary unemployment
exists.
2.5 The case of full-employment
If 𝐿𝑙 = 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙, full-employment is achieved. Then, (11) is re-written as
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
. (13) e4
Since 𝐿 𝑓 and 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 are constant (if 𝐿 = 𝐿 𝑓 ,𝜔 is constant), this is an identity not an equation.
On the other hand, (11) is an equation not an identity. (13) should be written as
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
≡ 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙).
This yields:
𝑃1 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙)
[𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀] .
Then, the nominal wage rate is determined by:
𝑊 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙)𝑃1.
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3 Effects of a decrease in the nominal wage rate
In the model of this paper, no mechanism determines the nominal wage rate except at
the full-employment state. For example, when the nominal value of 𝐺 increases, the
nominal aggregate demand and supply increase. If the nominal wage rate rises, the
prices also rise. If, when𝐺 increases, the prices rise considerably, then the outputsmight
not increase and involuntary unemploymentmight not decrease. If the prices do not rise
or rise only slightly, involuntary unemployment decreases.
Let us examine the effects on employment of a decrease in the nominal wage rate.
A decrease in the nominal wage rate induces decreases in the prices of the goods (see
(10)), and it does not directly rescue involuntary unemployment. Proposition 2.1 in Otaki
(2016) says
Suppose that the nominal wage sags. Then, as far as its indirect effects on the
aggregate demand are negligible, this only results in causing a proportionate
fall in the price level. In otherwords, a fall in the nominalwage never rescues
workers who are involuntarily unemployed.
However, indirect effects on aggregate demand due to a fall in the nominalwage ratemay
exist. We assume that falls in the nominal wage rate and the prices are not predicted by
consumers. If the prices of the goods fall, the real value of the older generation’s savings
increases. But, at the same time, decreases in the prices of the goods increase the real
value of the younger generation consumers’ debts.
The real values of the following variableswill bemaintained evenwhen both the nom-
inal wage rate and the prices fall.
𝐺/𝑃1: the government expenditure.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for an older generation consumer.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for a younger generation consumer when he retires.
On the other hand, the nominal value of 𝐷 and that of𝑀 −𝐿 𝑓𝑄, which is the older gen-
eration’s net savings, do not change. Therefore, from (12), whether a fall in the nominal
wage rate increases or decreases the effective demand depends on whether
𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝛼𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 (14) mq
is positive or negative. This is the so-called real balance effect. If 𝐷 or 𝑄 is large, (14) is
negative, and a fall in the nominal wage rate increases involuntary unemployment6.
4 Analysis of fiscal policy
4.1 Steady state with constant employment under constant prices
First consider a steady state where the employment is constant. With constant employ-
ment the real wage rate and the labor supply do not change, thus the output also does
6The discussion in this section is from the different perspectives of the real balance effect for which the
argument was fought by Pigou (1943) and Kalecki (1944).
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not change. We assume also 𝜌 = 1, that is, the constant prices of the goods. Consumers
correctly predict that the prices are constant. Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue. Then,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀. (15) ss1
At the steady sate it must be that ?ˆ? = 𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝑄. Thus,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀. (16) gt
The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension is equal to
𝑀 . Therefore,
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
= 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑀 = 𝑀. (17) fis1
This means
𝐺 − 𝑇 = 0.
Thus, tomaintain a satewith constant employment and priceswe need balanced budget.
4.2 Fiscal policy for full-employment under constant prices
Next, consider a fiscal policy to achieve full-employment from the state with involuntary
unemployment. The employment 𝐿 and the output 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase by fiscal policy. We
assume constant prices of the goods again. Consumers correctly predict that the prices
are constant. If the employment 𝐿 increases, the labor supply 𝑙, the real wage rate 𝜔 and
the labor productivity 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase in the case of increasing returns to scale. However,
in the case of decreasing returns to scale, the labor supply, the real wage rate and the
labor productivity may decrease. In the former (latter) case the rate of increase in the
output is probably larger (smaller) than the rate of increase in the employment. By (9)
we can assume that both are positive.
Let 𝐺′ and 𝑇 ′ be the government expenditure and the tax to achieve full-employment.
Then, (16) is written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′ + 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀. (18) td1
From this
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
= 𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ + 𝑀. (19) fis2
Suppose 𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ > 𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 , that is, the realization of full employment
will increase consumers’ disposable income. Then, from (17) and (19) we get
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ > 0. (20) ?gt2?
From this we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the realization of full employment will increase consumers’ disposable
income, in order to achieve full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment,
we need a budget deficit.
⟨p1⟩
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Let 𝐺′′, 𝑇 ′′ and𝑀′ be the government expenditure, the tax revenue and the savings of
the younger generation consumers in thenext period after realization of full-employment.
(16) is written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′′ + 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀
′.
To maintain full-employment the savings of the younger generation including the pay-
as-you-go pension must be equal to 𝑀′. Then, we have
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷] = 𝐺
′′ − 𝑇 ′′ + 𝑀′ = 𝑀′.
Therefore,
𝐺′′ − 𝑇 ′′ = 0.
This means that to maintain full-employment, budget deficit is not required. Thus, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the full-employment state has been achieved by fiscal policy, we do not
need budget deficit to maintain full-employment.
⟨p2⟩
A simple example
Assume 𝑀 = 0 and 𝑇 ′ = 0 in (18). Then,
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′ + 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷.
This means
𝐺′ = (1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
.
This is the government expenditure necessary to achieve full employment, and it is equal
to the savings of the younger generation. Let denote it by 𝑀′.
In the next period the following relation holds.
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′′ + 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀
′.
To maintain full-employment with 𝑇 ′′ = 0 we need
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷] = 𝐺
′′ + 𝑀′ = 𝑀′.
Thus,
𝐺′′ = 0.
Demand and supply of money
Demand for money carried over from Period 1 to Period 2 by consumers of the younger
generation is equal to the savings by consumers of the younger generation. It is equal to
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“consumption by consumers of the younger generation in the next period”
− “pay-as-you-go pension for the younger generation in the next period” −
“repayment of the debt by consumers of the next generation”.
On the other hand, supply of money is equal to
“consumption by consumers of the older generation” − “pay-as-you-go pen-
sion for the older generation” − “repayment of the debt by consumers of the
younger generation” + “government expenditure” − “taxes for government
expenditure”.
Under constant prices we have
“pay-as-you-gopension for the younger generation in thenext period”= “pay-
as-you-go pension for the older generation”,
and
“repayment of the debt by consumers the next generation” = “repayment of
the debt by consumers of the younger generation”.
Scholarships are offset by supply and repayment.
Then, (19) means
“consumption by consumers of the younger generation in the next period” −
“consumption by consumers of the older generation” = “government expen-
diture” − “taxes for government expenditure”.
Thus, demand for money and supply of money are equal, and money supply increases
by
“government expenditure” − “taxes for government expenditure”.
4.3 Realization of full-employment under inflation or deflation
First we assume that the output and the employment are constant, and the prices of the
goods rise or fall at the rate 𝜌 − 1. If 𝜌 > 1(< 1), consumers correctly predict that the
prices rise (fall). Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue. With 𝜌 ≠ 0, ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝑄. Thus, (15) is
written as
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀. (21) gt3
The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension must be
equal to 𝜌𝑀 . Therefore,
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
= 𝐺 −𝑇 + (𝜌− 1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷 +𝑄) +𝑀 = 𝜌𝑀. (22) fis4
This means that:
𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜌 − 1) (𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄). (23) gt-1
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If 𝑀 > 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄, in order to maintain a state where the output and the employment
are constant with rising prices (𝜌 > 1) (falling prices (𝜌 < 1)) a budget deficit (surplus)
is required. If 𝑀 < 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄, we obtain the inverse results.
Let 𝐺′ and 𝑇 ′ be the government expenditure and the tax to achieve full-employment.
Then, (21) is written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺′ + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀.
From this
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
= 𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷 + 𝑄) + 𝑀. (24) fis3
Suppose 𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ > 𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 , that is, the realization of full employment
will increase consumers’ disposable income. Then, from (22) and (24) we get
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ > (𝜌 − 1) (𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄).
Therefore, in order to achieve full-employment under inflation or deflation we need
budget deficit which is larger than (23).
Let 𝐺′′, 𝑇 ′′, 𝑀′ and 𝑃′
1
be the government expenditure, the tax revenue, the savings of
the younger generation consumers and the price of the consumption basket in the next
period after realization of full-employment. (21) is written as
𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺′′ + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑀
′.
To maintain full-employment, the savings of the younger generation including the pay-
as-you-go pension must be equal to 𝜌𝑀′. Then, we have
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) −𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺
′′ −𝑇 ′′ + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷 +𝑄) +𝑀
′
= 𝜌𝑀′.
Therefore,
𝐺′′ − 𝑇 ′′ = (𝜌 − 1) (𝑀′ − 𝐿 𝑓 𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄).
This means that to maintain full-employment, budget deficit larger than (23) is not re-
quired.
5 Game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary
unemployment and full-employment
⟨game⟩ A steady state under balanced budget with involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equi-
librium of a game with firms and consumers.
1. Given the government expenditure and tax, and the strategies of consumers and
other firms, each firmmaximizes its profit. Consumers’ strategies are labor supply
and consumption. Firms’ strategies are employment and production.
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2. Given the government expenditure and tax, and the strategies of other consumers
and firms, each employed consumer and each unemployed consumer maximize
their utility. Each unemployed consumer determines his strategy given a state
where he is not employed.
Further we present three more results.
1. Increases in employment and production by firms and increases in labor supply
and consumption by the younger generation consumers take the state out of the
Nash equilibrium because consumption of the older generation consumers is in-
sufficient.
2. If the government increases its expenditure keeping taxes intact, the full-employment
state may be in a Nash equilibrium. The budget deficit makes up for deficiency of
consumption of the older generation consumers.
3. Then, in the next period we can achieve full-employment without budget deficit
because consumption of the older generation consumers, who work when they
are young, is larger than consumption of the older generation consumers in the
previous period. This is a property of a dynamic OLG model.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
From Propositions 1 and 2 we can say that in order to achieve full-employment from a
state with involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the government. How-
ever, when full-employment is achieved, in order to maintain full-employment we need
balancedbudget. Therefore, additional government expenditure to achieve full-employment
should be financed by seigniorage not public debt.
We have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment and the effects of fis-
cal policy using a three-generation OLG model under monopolistic competition with in-
creasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. We considered the case of a divisible
labor supply, and we assumed that the goods are produced only by labor.
In future research, wewant to analyze involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in
a situation where goods are produced by capital and labor, and there exist investments
of firms.
Appendix: Some calculations
The first order condition for (2) is(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−
1
𝜎 − 𝜆𝑒
1
𝑝1(𝑧) = 0. (A.1) ap1
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From this (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)1−𝜎
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎 .
Then, (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)1−𝜎 ∫ 1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧 = 1,
It means
𝜆𝑒
1
(∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜎
= 1,
and so
𝑃1 =
1
𝜆𝑒
1
.
From (A.1 ) (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 = 𝜆𝑒
1
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧).
Then, (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
=𝐶𝑒
1
= 𝜆𝑒
1
∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 =
1
𝑃1
∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧.
Therefore, ∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
.
Similarly, ∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
.
Thus,∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ.
From (1)
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
= 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ).
By (A.1 ) (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−1 = 𝐶𝑒
1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−1 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)𝜎
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝜎
=
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)𝜎
.
From this we get
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ)
𝑃1
.
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧), 𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧) and 𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧) are similarly obtained.
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